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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
that this should stand regardless of whether the stockholder prays
for relief against the corporation or not. The only true objection to
diversity jurisdiction in stockholder's suits should be where the
element of collusion is present. Furthermore jurisdiction should be
determined from the pleadings not on the basis of conjectural bad
faith which only a trial on that issue could prove; 'an allegation
that the corporation has refused to sue to uphold rights the stock-
holder wishes to enforce should be sufficient to establish juris-
diction in the federal courts.
The rule unquestionably today is that a refusal by a corporation's
management based upon an honest difference of opinion is suf-
ficient to prevent realignment in stockholder's derivative suits
based upon diversity of citizenship, and is likewise sufficient to
comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (b). To achieve
this result, the Supreme Court refused to recognize the test laid
down in dicta in numerous cases decided in the past century,
because that dicta could not be tailored to achieve a just and
practical result in an area where it was needed. No invasion of
the doctrine of stare decisis has taken place; rather, the Court has
reached a sensible result not contemplated by prior decisions.
GARRY A. PEARSON
WHAT CONSTITUTES THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
IN NORTH DAKOTA
.Not too many centuries ago it was generally believed that evil
spirits were responsible for the illnesses that plague mankind.
Though the modem patient does not entertain that absurdity, his
state of enlightenment regarding the nature of the ailments that
beset him is but little advanced beyond that of his Stone Age
counterpart. Happily, however, the modern patient enjoys the
benefits of a vast fund of medical knowledge and a set of laws
assuring him, to a considerable degree, that those in whom he en-
trusts his health and life are possessed of that knowledge. It is with
these laws, the laws regulating the practice of medicine, that this
paper is concerned.'
1. General references include: Lott and Gray, Law in Medical and Dental Practice
(1942); Bangs, Christian Science Practice -Legality, 25 J. Crim. L. 271 (1934); Cald-
well, Early Legislation Regulating the Practice of Medicine, 18 IlI. L. Rev. 225 (1923);
Field, Nature of the A.M.A. Fight Against Quackery in Medicine, 9 Food, Drug, Cosmetic
L. J. 213 (1954); Grills, Regulation of the Practice of Medicine in the State of Michigan,
15 U. Detroit L. J. 42 (1952); Heilman, Medical Charlatanism, Legal Control of, 22
N. C. L. Rev. 23 (1943); Sears, Legal Control of Medical Practice; Validity and Methods,
44 Mich. L. Rev. 689 (1946).
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What is the practice .of medicine? At least two definitions of
the term exist: (a) the broad generalization used for lay and
medical purposes which declares that the practice of medicine is
the science and art dealing with the prevention, cure, and alle-
viation of diseases;2 (b) the statutory definitions of the term found
in every state, utilized for purposes of regulating the medical pro-
fession and its competitors.3
The essence of the statutory definitions may be summarized
by stating that they confer, upon an individual licensed to pract-
ice medicine, a substantially unqualified" right to utilize any heal-
ing technique that the individual's experience and professional
ability may indicate. In this permissive aspect the statutes employ
substantially the lay and medical definition of the term "practice
of medicine" noted above. However in all states, the statutes possess
a restrictive effect as well, and make classifications among the prac-
titioners of the various theories of the healing art such as chiroprac-
tors5 , osteopaths,6 and the like. Customarily, these persons are given
a legal franchise to a practice of much more limited character
and are forbidden to go beyond the boundaries of specified tech-
niques and methods of practice.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF STATUTES
Under the early common law, all those who so desired could
practice the art of healing. These early practitioners were, however,
2. See State v. Borah, 51 Ariz. 318, 76 P.2d 757, 758 (1938) (dictum); Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary (2d Ed. 1953). Arguably, a third definition is possible, i.e.,
that used by the members of the medical profession among themselves in application and
interpretation of the Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association
(1955). See also, Code of Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Hospitals (Medico-
Moral) (Catholic Hospitals Ass'n of the United States and Canada).
3. See, e.g., N.D. Sess. Laws 1957 c. 302, § 1: "Definitions: In this chapter, unless
the context or subject matter otherwise requires: (1) Physician shall include physician and
surgeon (2) Practice of medicine shall include the practice of medicine, surgery and
obstetrics. The following persons shall be regarded as practicing medicine: (a) One who
holds himself out to the public as being engaged within this state in the diagnosis or
treatment of diseases or injuries of human beings; (b) One who suggests, recommends,
or prescribes any form of treatment for the intended relief or cure of any physical or
mental ailment of any person, with the intention of receiving, directly or indirectly, any
fee, gift, or compensation; (c) One who maintains an office for the examination or
treatment of persons afflicted with disease or injury of the body or mind; (d) One who
attaches the title M.D., surgeon, doctor, or any other word or abbreviation to his name,
indicating that he is engaged in the treatment or diagnosis of the diseases or injuries of
human beings shall be held to be engaged in the practice of medicine." For a compilation
of such statutes, see the American Medical Directory of the American Medical Association
(19th Ed. 1956).
4. See, e.g., N.D. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 302, § 1. Compare ibid. with N.D. Rev. Code
J§ 43-1401 (Practice of Osteopathy) and 43-0601 (1943) (Practice of Chiropractic).
The medical profession has limited the practice of its members by designating certain areas
within the practice of medicine as specialties, requiring additional training and tests of
those who would identify themselves as specialists; see Directory of Medical Specialists
(8th Ed. 1957).
5. See, e.g., N.D. Rev. Code § 43-0601 (1943).
6. Id. at § 43-1401.
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subject to liability for damages in case of. want of skill, and to the
right of the government to proceed by quo warranto to prevent
incompetents from practicing.
7
In 1511 the statute 3 Hen. VIII, c. 11, prohibited all persons
from practicing medicine until they had been examined and ap-
proved by a bishop.' In the United States the first "well-considered"
act regulating the practice of medicine was enacted by the City
of New York in 1760; New Jersey followed suit in 1772.1 In the
ensuing century similar statutes spread across the country, and
medical practice acts are now found in every state.10
REGULATORY POWER OF THE STATES
As stated in the oft-cited case of Dent v. West Virginia,1' "It is
undoubtedly the right of any citizen of the United States to follow
any lawful calling, business, or profession he may choose, subject
only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like
age, sex, and condition."'' However, "The power of the state to
provide for the general welfare of its people authorizes it to pre-
scribe all such regulations as, in its judgment, will secure or tend
to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and in-
capacity as well as deception and fraud."' 3 In other words, the
right to practice medicine, though a valuable property right,"
is a conditional right that is subject to the police power of the
state.15
The means by which the states exercise their regulatory power
are: statutes requiring the licensing of practitioners, 6 provisions for
the revocation of the licenses'7 and for the imposition of liabilities
for practicing without a license.'8 Of course, the state's authority
7. State v. Borah, 51 Ariz. 318, 76 P.2d 757, 758 (1938) (dictum).
8. Lott and Gray, Law in Medical and Dental Practice, 344 (1942).
9. Id. at 347.
10. See note 3 supra.
11. 129 U.S. 114 (1889). (Defendant was indicted for the unlawful practice of medi-
cine after a board of medical examiners had refused him a certificate on the ground
that he was not a graduate of a "reputable medical school." Defendant was entitled o
take a qualifying exam under the statute, which was enacted after he had engaged
in the practice for some time, but failed to do so. Defendant appealed his conviction on
the ground that the medical practice act adopted by West Virginia deprived him, without
due process of law, of his right to practice medicine. Defendant was a graduate of Ihe
"American Medical Eclectic College of Cincinnati, Ohio." The court held that the
defendant was not deprived of liberty or property without due process of law by the
application of the statute to him.)
12. Id. at 121.
13. Id. at 122.
14. Hewitt v. State Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 84 Pac. 39 (1906).
15. Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926); State v. Borah, 51 Ariz. 318,
76 P.2d 757, 758 (1938) (dictum).
16, See, e.g., N.D. Rev. Code § 43-1716 (1943).
17. See, e.g., N.D. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 302, . 13.
18. See, e.g., N.D. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 302, 15.
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thus to utilize the police power in the field of medical practice
is not unlimited, but is restricted by the existence of other con-
stitutional postulates. ' Though the legislature cannot, considering
the present state of general medical knowledge, confine all healing
to any one school or practice, 0 distinctions may be made and
schools or methods of practice may be exempted from regulation
or subjected to special regulations, so long as the discrimination
is not arbitrary or unreasonable.2' This regulatory power is not
limited to the state alone: In Johnson v. Great Falls 22 it was held
that the legislature could, by statute, empower a city to impose
regulative ordinances on the professions.
WHAT CONSTITUTES THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE?
As noted above, the states have, without exception, enacted
medical practice acts.2 3 Generally, the statutes do not specify what
shall constitute a violation thereof; rather, they use only general




Under some statutes, the question as to whether or not there
19. See, e.g., Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910) (In this case the defendant
was convicted under a Maryland statute of practicing medicine without a license. The
defendant contended that the statute denied him equal protection under the laws in that it
(a) exempted physicians who had been practicing in Maryland prior to 1898 from the
necessity of applying for a license and (b) because it did not apply to resident or assistant
resident physicians or students in hospitals in the discharge of their duties, or to outside
physicians called into Maryland for consultation on cases, or to military surgeons on duty
with the armed forces, or to chiropodists, etc. The court held that these classifications are
reasonable and, hence, constitutional.); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (See
note 12 supra); Hewitt v. State Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 84 Pac. 39 (1906)
(Proceedings in certorari to review and annul an order of the board of medical examiners
revocation of petitioner's license to practice medicine. Practitioner was engaged in the
practice by virtue of a certificate issued to her by the "Eclectic Medical Society" of
California and advertised that she could cure cancer by the "only sure cure known in the
world." The statute under which the board proceeded stated that "all advertising of *nedical
business in which grossly improbable statements are made" constitute professional mis-
conduct. The court held that the statute was too vague and indefinite to be capable of
enforcement and the order of the board was set aside. The court declared that right to
practice medicine is a "valuable property right" protected by the Constitution, and that
the statute failed from a constitutional standpoint in that it furnished no standard by which
the physician could determine in advance what statements could be treated as "grossly
improbable."). Hurley v. People, 99 Colo. 510, 63 P.2d 1227, 1229 (1936) (The Supreme
Court of Colorado approved the trial court's instruction that "[Tihe defendant and every
citizen of Colorado is vested with the following inherent constitutional rights, of which
even the legislature cannot deprive him: To engage in the calling or occupation of
teaching any branch or system of learning that is not inherently injurious or that cannot
reasonably be regarded as harmful to the public health, welfare, safety, or morals. ).
20. State v. Biggs, 133 N.C. 729, 46 S.E. 401 (1903).
21. Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935) "The
state was not bound to deal alike with all these classes, or to strike at all evils at the same
time or in the same way. It could deal with the different, professions according to the
needs of the public in relation to each."; Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910);
Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211, 64 N.E. 862 (1902).
22. 38 Mont. 369, 99 Pac. 1059 (1909).
23. See note 3 supra. For a compilation of such statutes, see the American Medical
Directory of the American Medical Association (19th Ed. 1956).
24. See, e.g., N.D. Rev. Code § 43-1716 (1943).
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has been a violation hinges to an extent on whether the service
or treatment is for compensation or is gratuitous. It would seem
that there would be no violation of some statutes if the act were
gratuitous.2 1 Other statutes make no reference whatsoever to the
matter of compensation.26 The North Dakota statute, while making
reference to the matter of compensation, is so drawn that a service
or treatment by an unlicensed party would constitute a violation
whether or not the act was gratuitous.2 7 A distinction between
gratuitous and paid-for services was made in a Maryland statute
sustained in Watson v. Maryland..21s
It has been held that one of the necessary elements of the
practice of medicine is the diagnosis of that patient's symptoms
to determine what disease or infirmity he is afflicted with.29 How-
ever, there are statutes that make no reference to diagnosis in
their definitions of the practice of medicine.3o It would seem that
the North Dakota statute could be violated whether or not there
was a diagnosis, in that the statute provides, inter alia, that "One
who holds himself out to the public as being engaged within this
state in the diagnosis or treatment of diseases or injuries of human
beings .... " is practicing medicine."1
The giving of medicine is not an essential element of the pract-
ice of medicine.22 The United States Supreme Court affirmed
without an opinion a Louisiana case which held that the appli-
cation of physical force to parts of the body for the purpose of
curing disease or relieving bodily ailments constituted the practice
of medicine 23 North Dakota's statutory definition of the practice
of medicine would seem to be sufficiently broad to include an
act which would not involve the giving or prescribing of a medi-
cine. 4
It has been held that the periodic visits of a physician, licensed
to practice in one state, to a town in a neighboring state, the
examination of patients in the latter town, and the sending of medi-
cal advice and medicine to them from the state of his residence
25. See, e.g., Rev. Codes of Mont. Ann. § 66-1007 (Choate 1947); Miss. Code Ann.
§ 8888 (1942); Rev. Stat. of Maine c. 66, § 7 (1954).
26. See, e.g., Fla. Statutes § 458.13 (1953); Compiled Laws-Mich. § 338.9 (1948).
27. See note 3 supra.
28. 218 U.S. 173 (1910).
29. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cunningham, 54 F.2d 927 (S.D. Fla. 1932); Frank
v. South, 145 Ky. 416, 194 S.W. 375 (1917).
30. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 147.10 (1946).
31. N.D. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 302, § 1.
32. State v. Bresee, 137 Iowa 673, 114 N.W. 45 (1907); Slocum v. Fredonia, 134 Kan.
853, 8 P.2d 332 (1932).
33. Louisiana State Medical Examiners v. Fife, 162 La. 681, 111 So. 58 afi'd, 274 U.S.
720 (1927); see also, State v. Smith, 223 Mo. 242, 135 S.W. 465 (1911).
34. See note 3 supra.
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constitutes the practice of medicine in such town.:" However, the
North Dakota medical practice act exempts from its provisions
physicians, licensed to practice in other states or countries, meet-
ing legally licensed physicians in this state for the purpose of
consultation.' Also exempted, are those physicians residing on
the border of a neighboring state, provided that they do not open
an office or appoint a place to receive calls or meet patients with-
in North Dakota.37
It would seem that one practicing medicine without a license
would contravene the North Dakota medical practice act though
he did not assume to be a physician.' In an Iowa case, it was held
that it is not necessary that one assume to be a physician in order
to violate the statute, for anyone treating the sick may be found
guilty of practicing medicine.'9 Nor can one practicing medicine
without a license shield himself behind the fact that he is in th
employ of one who has a license, as it is the person performing the
act of practice that the statute seeks to regulate.40
OSTEOPATHY
In 1874 one Andrew T. Still devised a then drugless and non-
surgical technique of curing diseases by massaging and manipulat-
ing the bones of the body. This system of healing, termed "osteo-
pathy", is defined by Webster as, "A system of medical practice
based on the theory that disease is due chiefly to mechanical de-
rangement in tissues, placing emphasis on restoration of functional
integrity by manipulation of the parts. The use of medicines, sur-
gery, proper diets, psychotherapy, and other measures are included
in ostepathy."
41-
Generally, the medical practice acts of the several states specific-
ally declare that osteopthy is not the practice of medicine within
the meaning of the statute.12 However, the statutes affording osteo-
paths the right to practice their system of healing vary considerably
in the latitude of practice permitted by these practitioners. North
Dakota's provisions regarding the practice of osteopathy 43 place
35. Slocum v. Fredonia, 134 Kan. 853, 8 P.2d 332 (1932); State v. Davies, 194 Mo.
485, 92 S.W. 484 (1906).
36. N.D. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 302, § 2 (8).
37. Id. at (2).
38. See note 3 supra.
39. State v. Bresee, 137 Iowa 673, 114 N.W. 45 (1907).
40. State v. Paul, 56 Neb. 359, 76 N.W. 861 (1898); Gobin v. State, 9 Okla. Crim.
Rep. 201, 131 Pac. 546 (1913).
41. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (2d Ed. 1953).
42. See, e.g., N.D. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 302, § 2 (7).
43. N.D. Rev. Code e. 43-14 (1943).
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the state among those that prohibit the practitioner of osteopathy
from performing major surgery and prescribing or using medical
agents.4 North Dakota does, however, permit osteopaths to pract-
ice obstetrics and to use general anesthesia and pituitrin in the
conduct of that practice.45
The North Dakota statute that authorizes the practice of osteo-
pathy provides that the osteopath is subject to and required to
observe all state and municipal regulations relating to the control
of contagious and infectious diseases, the signing of birth and
death certificates, and the signing of certificates pertaining to pub-
lic health; it is further provided that certificates signed by an
osteopath shall have the same force and effect as those signed
by any other licensed practitioner."' The statute also provides that
the osteopath has the same rights as other physicians with respect
to treatment of patients in institutions maintained wholly or in part
by public funds, and in matters pertaining to disability compensa-
tion or adjustment or such claims."
It is interesting to note that while those who render gratuitous
assistance to a sick or injured person in case of an emergency are
specifically exempted from the provisions of the North Dakota
Code pertaining to the practice of osteopathy,48 there is no such
similar provision pertaining to the practice of medicine.
CHIROPRACTIC
It was in the last decade of the 19th century that one D. D.
Palmer, an Iowa grocer,4 9 devised the system of healing known
as "chiropractic."5" In Joyner v. State,5 chiropractic was defined
as a system of healing that treats diseases by manipulation of the
spinal column.
Generally, the statutory provisions regarding the practice of
chiropractic either implicitly l or explicitly" interdict the use of
drugs or medicines 'and the practice of surgery by the chiropractor.
North Dakota's statutory definition of the practice of chiroproctic
44. Id. at 43-1401. See also Rev. Code of Mont. Ann. § 66-1406 (Choate 1947). But
see, Fla. Stat. § 459.07 (1953).
45. N.D. Rev. Code § 43-1401 (1943).
46. Id. at § 43-1422.
47. Id. at § 43-1423.
48. Id. at § 43-1402.
49. K. C. Doyle, Science v. Chiropractic, Public Affairs Pamphlet 191 (1st Ed. 1953).
50. Ibid. Fishbein, Modern Medical Charlatans, 16 Hygeia 21 (Jan. 1938).
51. 181 Miss. 245, 179 So. 573 (1938).
52. See, e.g., Compiled Laws Mich. § 338.156 (1948).
53. See, e.g., N.D. Rev. Code § 43-0601 (1943); Fla. Stat. § 460.11-(2) (b) (1953);
Rev. Stat. of Maine c. 72 § 12 (1954); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 148.08 (2) (1946); Rev. Code
of Mont. Ann. § 66.509 (Choate 1947).
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states that it ". . . shall not include prescribing for or administer-
ing to any person any medicine or drug to be taken internally
which is now or hereafter included in matera medica, nor per-
forming any surgery ....
In at least two jurisdictions, the statutes defining the practice
of chiropractic expressly deny the chiropractor the right to practice
obstetrics.;' The statute further provides that the chiropractor shall
not be entitled to treat contagious or infectious diseases.'
As is the case with the osteopath, the North Dakota statute
authorizes the chiropractor to sign birth and death certificates as
well as certificates pertaining to public health.5 7 However, the
provision states that those certificates shall have, the same force
and effect " ..as if signed by licensed physicians." s The corres-
ponding provision regarding osteopaths states that certificates
signed by such practitioners ". . . shall the same force and effect
as if signed by any other licensed practitioner.""
In Kahn v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.," a policy holder who
failed to disclose that she had been treated by a chiropractor within
two years of her application for the policy was held to have had
received "medical or surgical treatment" within the meaning of the
policy, and her beneficiary was denied recovery.
OPTOMETRY
Statutes regulating the practice of optometryt and provisions
excepting that practice from the definition of the practice of
medicine '12 are now general. Such statutes usually, if not always,
define the practice of optometry and, either iii express terms or
by necessary implication, restrict a licensee to practice that branch
of the healing art as it is defined and limited in the statuteY'
North Dakota's statutory definition of the practice of optometry is
typical in its explicit prohibition of the use of drugs, medicines,
or surgery.t4
54. N.D. Rev. Code § 43-0601 (1943).
55. Ibid; S.D. Code § 27.0510 (1939).
56. S.D. Code § 27.0510 (1939), Coty v. Baughman, 50 S.D. 372, 210 N.W. 348
(1926). However, this statute has been construed as permitting a licensed chiropractor to
treat a patient within the prohibited class for some other disease for which chiropractic
is a recognized therapeutic, if his treatment is given honestly and in good faith and not
for the purpose of evading the statute.
57. N.D. Rev. Code § 43-0616 (1943).
58. Ibid.
59. Id. at § 43-1422.
60. 132 N.1J. -L. 503, 41 A.2d 329 (1945).
61. See, e.g., N.D. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 284, § 1.
62. See, e.g., N.D. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 202, § 2 (5).
63. See note 61 supra.
64. Ibid.
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Prior to the enactment of such statutes and where the statutory
definition of the practice of medicine was very broad and com-
prehensive in its terms,'the practice of optometry,65 as well as
the practices of osteopathy"" and chiropractic, 7 was held to con-
stitute the practice of medicine.
CHIROPODY
As defined by the North Dakota Code, the term "chiropodist"
means one ". . . who examines, diagnoses, and treats abnormal
nail conditions, excresences occurring on the feet including corns,
warts, callosities, bunions, and arch disorders . ".8.."I" A 1957
amendment of the North Dakota Code specifically excepted the
chiropodist from the provisions of the statute defining the practice
of medicine. " In an Idaho case, 70 the court held that chiropody
does not constitute the practice of medicine, and observed that
"It is a well known fact, of which the court will take judicial
notice, that physicians and surgeons do not, and will not, do the
ordinary work of the chiropodist. Under a reasonable interpretation
chiropody does not involve the practice of medicine or surgery,
either major or minor."
The North Dakota Code recognizes the "doctor of surgical
chiropody" and authorizes him to perform minor foot surgery, and
to use local anesthetics in the process of that practice. 71 In 1955,
the statute governing the professional use of narcotics was amend-
ed to entitle the doctor of surgical chiropody, along with the
physician and dentist, to prescribe, administer, and dispense nar-
cotic drugs.71
PRAYER AND FAITH HEALING
Generally, Christian Science and other religious tenets involv-
ing healing by prayer and faith are specifically excepted from the
statutory definitions of the practice of medicine. 73 Typical of many
65. Baker v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. Rep. 521, 240 S.W. 924 (1922). Contra, People v.
Smith, 208 I11. 31, 69 N.E. 810 (1904).
66. Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288 (1912); Bandel v. Dept. of Health of City of New
York, 193 N.Y. 133, 85 N.E. 1067 (1908).
67. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Fife, 162 La. 681, 111 So. 58 (1926)
(afl'd mem., 274 U.S. 720) (1927); Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 221 Mass. 184, 108
N.E. 893 (1915).
68. N.D. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 195, § 1 (1).
69. N.D. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 302, 2 (10).
70. State v. Armstrong, 38 Idaho 493, 225 Pac. 491, 492 (1924) Idaho law provided
for the licensing of practitioners of medicine and surgery, osteopathy and chiropractic, but
made no reference to chiropodists.
71. N.D. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 295, § 1 (1).
72. N.D. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 164, § 1 (1).
73. See, e.g., N.D. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 302, § 2 (6).
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such provisions is that of North Dakota, which states that those
who attempt to heal by prayer are exempt from the provisions of
the chapter defining the practice of medicine ". . . if the person
administering . . . such religions . . .healing does not prescribe
or administer drugs or medicines and does not perform surgical
or physical operations, and if he does not hold himself out to be
a physician or surgeon .... ."7 Such a provision is not an un-
constitutional infringement upon the right to worship.
7
Prior to the enactment of provisions exempting the practice of
Christian Science healing from the statutory definitions of the
practice of medicine, there was some diversity among the courts
as to whether or not such was the practice of medicine. In State v.
Mylod,76 it was held that the practice of healing by Christian
Science was not the practice of medicine. However, where the Christ-
ian Scientist healed for compensation, he was found guilty of
practicing medicine without a license.
7
7
It has been held that a statute requiring a pa'rent to furnish
medical attention for a sick child is not complied with by securing
the attendance of a Christian Science healer."
CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
The courts are almost universally in accord that the medical
practice acts necessarily exclude all but natural persons from the
right to obtain a license, 71 a corporation cannot present the neces-
sary high school and college diplomas, nor can it pass a state
board examination or tender the requisite certificate of character.
In addition, there is the point of view that the practice of medi-
cine by corporations for profit through the employment of licensed
physicians has a tendency to debase the profession, and is con-
trary to public policy80 However, there is authority that bene-
74. Ibid.
75. State v. Miller, 59 N.D. 287, 229 N.W. 569 (1930). Cf. Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (The defendant, charged with bigamy, contended that his
religion countenanced polygamy and that the state was unconstitutionally interfering
with his right to worship. The court said that "Laws are made for the government -i
actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they
may with practices.").
76. 20 R.I. 632, 40 AtI. 753 (1898).
77. State v. Boswell, 40 Neb. 158, 58 N.W. 728 (1894); State v. Marble, 72 Ohio St.
21, 73 N.E. 1063 (1905).
78. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243, 247 (1903) (The court said Ihat
failure to provide an ill child with medical attention ". . . is a pulic wrong, which
the state, under its police powers, may prevent.").
79. People ex rel. State Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal.2d 156,
82 P.2d 429, 430 (1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 633 (1939) "It is an established doctrine
that a corporation may not engage in practice of such professions as law, medicine or
dentistry."; People v. United Medical Service, 363 I1. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936). Contra,
State Electro-Medical Institute v. Platner, 74 Neb. 40, 130 N.W. 1079 (1905).
80. Bartron v. Codington County, 68 S.D. 309, 2 N.W.2d 337 (1942).
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volent associations not operated for profit do not engage in the
practice of medicine by furnishing the services of physicians to
its members."
It is interesting to note that the courts have upheld statutes
or regulations prohibiting one who does not have a license to
practice medicine or dentistry from owning, maintaining, or op-
erating an office therefor.12
On the basis of the proposition that optometry is a mechanical
rather than a learned profession, it has been held that the cor-
porate practice of optometry is not repugnant with public policy,
and may be engaged in unless the regulatory statute expressly
limits the practice to duly licensed individuals or persons.83
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81. Group'Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445 (D.C. 1938); Butterworth v. Boyd,
12 Cal.2d 140, 82 P.2d 434 (1938).
82. People v. United Medical Service, 363 111. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936); State v.
Boren, 36 Wash.2d 522, 219 P.2d 566, app. dism'd, 340 U.S. 881 (1950).
83. Silver v. Lansburgh & Bros., 111 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Georgia State Exam-
iners v. Friedman's Jewelers, 183 Ga. 669, 189 S.E. 238 (1936); Dvorine v. Castelberg
Jewelry Corp., 170 Md. 661, 185 Atl. 562 (1936).
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